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INTRODUCTION 
During most of the twentieth century, state and local regulatory 
bodies coordinated the siting of power plants and transmission lines.1 
These bodies focused on two important issues: (1) the determination 
of “need,” so as to avoid unnecessary economic duplication of costly 
infrastructure; and (2) environmental protection, so as to provide lo-
cal land use and other environmental concerns input on the place-
ment of necessary generation and transmission facilities.2 With the 
rise of a deregulated wholesale power market, the issue of need is in-
creasingly determined by the market, not regulators. Environmental 
concerns with siting, however, frequently remain contested, especially 
locally, but the regulatory apparatus for processing these concerns 
faces new challenges in deregulated markets. As this Article suggests, 
environmental concerns in transmission line siting will increasingly be 
addressed at the federal level, with federal concerns predominating 
consideration of the issues. The dormant commerce clause does much 
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 1. See THE ENERGY FOUNDATION/THE HEW LETT FOUNDATION, SITING POW ER PLANTS: RECENT 
EXPERIENCES IN CALIFORNIA AND BEST PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES (2002), at 
http://www.ef.org/documents/Siting_Report.pdf (describing the traditional power plant siting practices 
in California and other states); EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATE-LEVEL ELECTRIC TRANSM ISSION 
LINE SITING REGULATIONS (2001), at http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/energy_infrastructure/ 
transmission/siting_directory.pdf (noting that siting of transmission lines has traditionally been 
regulated at the state level). See also Linda L. Randell & Bruce L. M cDermott, Chonicle of a 
Transmission Line Siting, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 1, 2003, at 1 (referring to the "good old 
days" of transmission line siting). 
 2. Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision W ithout Site; Site W thout Vision, ELEC. J., Oct. 
2003, at 23, 24 ("The traditional siting regime . . . envisioned a two-part analysis: one to ascertain need 
and one to judge the environmental effects of available options."). 
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of the work towards making this a predominantly federal concern, but 
eventually the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC’s”) 
jurisdiction over such matters must be expanded by statute. 
Even if Congress does not expand FERC’s jurisdiction, this Arti-
cle argues that courts can play a positive role to facilitate the resolu-
tion of state-federal siting conflicts. A recent siting dispute involving a 
power line in the Long Island Sound illustrates this fundamental shift 
in the environmental discourse of siting proceedings, as a well as a 
need for modifications to federal law regarding transmission siting.3 
Ultimately, FERC may need authority to preempt state siting laws, 
but absent congressional action, courts might empower state and local 
siting boards to take into account federal goals in competitive mar-
kets in making siting decisions. 
I.  THE CROSS-SOUND KEYSPAN TRANSMISSION LINE SITING 
DISPUTE 
A recent example of the conflict between state siting and deregu-
lated wholesale power markets involves the Cross-Sound KeySpan 
transmission project. Regulatory officials in the state of Connecticut 
have strongly opposed the Cross-Sound Cable, a 23-mile merchant 
transmission line that would allow Long Island Power Authority to 
import power to Brook Haven, Long Island from New Haven, Con-
necticut, leading to significant delays in the operation of the project.4 
The project sponsor built the line in 2002, following FERC’s approval 
of retail sales at negotiated transmission rates,5 as well as permit ap-
provals by the Army Corp of Engineers, the New York Public Service 
Commission, the Connecticut Siting Council, and the Connecticut 
Department of Environmental Protection.6 The project complied with 
all state siting and environmental statutes, except for a provision of its 
state-issued permit that required the lines to be buried at a certain 
depth.7 Expansion of transmission access to locations such as New 
York City would provide important capacity, and may have helped in 
 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See Randall & M cDermott, supra note 1. 
 5. TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230 (2000). 
 6. See Regional Energy Reliability And Security: Doe Authority To Energize The Cross Sound 
Cable: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy and Commerce, House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 108th Cong. 55-56 (M ay 19, 2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Jeffrey A. Donahue, 
Chairman & CEO, Cross-Sound Cable Co.). 
 7. Id. at 18 (referring to Connecicut DEP refusal to modify permit). 
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absorbing some of the transmission shortages that exacerbated the 
Summer 2003 blackout.8 
In burying the transmission line, the project sponsor encountered 
some problems. It discovered hard sediments and bedrock protru-
sions along portions of the route, and immediately notified the Army 
Corps and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protec-
tion.9 Some Connecticut officials cited environmental concerns in op-
posing the project, such as impacts on shellfish beds and operations in 
the New Haven Harbor.10 The transmission line was built, however, 
and according to the project sponsor’s CEO the line was “buried to 
the permit depth along 98 percent of the entire span and over 90% of 
the route with the Federal Channel to an average of 50.7 feet below 
mean low water, well below the required level of minus 48 feet.”11 
Nevertheless, the opposition of Connecticut officials kept the 
transmission line from becoming operational until 2004.12 This may be 
a well-intended dispute over environmental regulation, but the line 
was opposed not only by environmental interests in the state of Con-
necticut. As often is the case with blocking a new entrant to a state’s 
power industry, there is also an anti-competitive angle to opposition 
to the Cross-Sound line. Northeast Utilities, a major investor-owned 
utility whose customers reside primarily in Connecticut (and which 
also services customers in Massachusetts and New Hampshire), owns 
an older, competing transmission line (the 1385 cable) that runs paral-
lel to the Cross-Sound Cable.13 Northeast Utilities favored updating 
its line over approving the Cross-Sound line, with which it would 
compete, and requested FERC to use its authority under Section 210 
of the FPA to order New York to assist in replacing the 1385 cables.14 
After the Cross-Sound transmission line was built, Connecticut 
passed a moratorium on the siting of new or expanded transmission 
 
 8. The technical advantage to operating two transmission lines between Connecticut and Long 
Island, as opposed to one, is that this would allow electric power to travel in a semi-circular loop – in 
and out of Long Island, depending on load. 
 9. Id. at 56. 
 10. Id. at 59. 
 11. Id. at 56. 
 12. Linda Randell & Bruce M cDermott, Cross-Sound Blues: Legal Challenges Continue for the 
Undersea Transmission Line, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Feb.2004, at 20. 
 13. Bruce W . Radford, Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot, FORTNIGHTLY'S SPARK, June 
2004, at 1, 3. 
 14. Id. at 10. 
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lines across Long Island Sound,15 effectively limiting the project spon-
sors’ ability to make the project comply with Connecticut’s under-
standing of the permits. The Cross-Sound Cable was authorized to 
operate under an emergency order issued by the U.S. Secretary of 
Energy following the August 2003 blackout, but that order was lifted 
in early 2004, leaving the Cross-Sound line without permission to go 
live.16 So effectively, the Cross-Sound cable was completed in 2002, 
but remained dormant as a permanent transmission alternative until 
Summer 2004, due to a regulatory impasse between the state of Con-
necticut, on the one hand, and Cross-Sound’s investors and the state 
of New York, on the other. As of Summer 2004, a settlement between 
the parties allowed the line to go live.17 
As FERC Chairman Pat Wood indicated before Congress in 
May 2004, Federal regulation seems ill-equipped to resolve the issue.18 
In the context of the 1385 line dispute, Long Island Power Company 
requested that FERC use its authority under the Federal Power Act 
to direct KeySpan to recommence commercial operation of the Cross-
Sound line, notwithstanding the objections of state regulators.19 How-
ever, although FERC has embraced wholesale deregulation, FERC 
lacks the authority to preempt the state environmental siting process 
for the transmission line.20 Connecticut’s Attorney General, backed 
by environmental interest groups and Northeast Utilities, threatened 
litigation if the Cross-Sound line is allowed to go live again, instead 
favoring expansion of the existing transmission line, owned by North-
east Utilities.21 
To the extent that transmission remains entirely within the con-
trol of local, rather than national, regulators, states have strong incen-
tives to protect their own incumbent firms or citizens, rather than 
 
 15. Conn. Governor Signs M oratorium on Grid Projects, Keeping Cross Sound in Limbo, POW ER 
M ARKETS W EEK, June 30, 2003, at 31. 
 16. Under Section 202(c) of the FPA, the U.S. Secretary of Energy can mandate operation of a 
transmission line over objections of state regulators, but only in the context of an emergency – not 
where it is merely found to be in the public interest. 
 17. Parties Set Deal to Energize Cross Sound Cable, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June 28, 2004, at 1 [herein-
after Parties Set Deal]. 
 18. Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Patrick W ood, III, Chairman, FERC). 
 19. Radford, supra note 13, at 10. 
 20. See supra notes 1 & 2 (describing state siting process). See also Donald F. Santa & Richard 
Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: W ill the Electric Industry Transition Track Natural Gas 
Industry Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L. J. 113, 123 (2004) (noting "state regulators' jurisdiction over a 
traditional electric utility's retail operations include: retail rate setting, construction and siting of gener-
ating and transmission facilities"). 
 21. Radford, supra note 13. 
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supporting interstate cooperative market norms. Only after threaten-
ing to approve expansion of the 1385 cables, was FERC able to force 
the parties to the bargaining table.22 FERC could not preempt the 
states and mandate operation of the Cross-Sound transmission line, 
but the threat of it making a decision elsewhere led stakeholders to 
negotiate a settlement that allowed the line to operate.23 
The Cross-Sound transmission line is not a unique example of 
state or local regulation blocking the expansion of infrastructure that 
is critical to interstate power markets. As Ashley Brown reports, 
transmission expansion projects spawn massive NIMBY concerns, 
frequently generating state and local opposition.24 To make matters 
worse, many state legislatures fail to authorize state siting boards to 
even take into account interstate concerns and some states even allow 
localities to block transmission expansion projects.25 
II.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE  
AS A NECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION 
Although it is not an express mandate of the text of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause,26 the dormant commerce clause 
doctrine limits of the power of a state government to impair free 
trade. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost 
our power to declare an Act of Congress Void. I do think the Un-
ion would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to 
the laws of the several states. For one in my place sees how often a 
local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national 
views and how often action is taken that embodies what the Com-
merce Clause was meant to end.27 
Among recent judicial skeptics, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
the doctrine is referred to as the “negative” commerce clause, indicat-
ing its lack of textual basis in the Constitution.28 Notwithstanding the 
 
 22. Parties Set Deal, supra note 17. 
 23. New York and Connecticut Agree to End Cable Dispute, N.Y. TIM ES, June 25, 2004, at B6. 
Interestingly, the most vocal opponent of the transmission line, Connecticut Attorney General Richard 
Blumenthal, was excluded from the negotiations. They Can Bury the Cable, But Not the Controversy, 
HARTFORD COURANT, July 7, 2004, at A9. 
 24. Brown & Daniels, supra note 2. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The Commerce Clause provides that "the Congress shall have power . . . to regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 27. OLIVER W ENDELL HOLM ES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920). 
 28. Skeptics believe that the purposes of the dormant commerce clause can readily be served by 
other more textually explicit constitutional doctrines, such as the Import-Export Clause of Article I, 
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lack of textual support for the doctrine in the Constitution, the juris-
prudence of the dormant commerce clause has a long-standing basis 
in American constitutional jurisprudence. As Justice Cardozo fa-
mously remarked in striking down a New York Law that set mini-
mum prices all milk dealers were required to pay New York milk 
producers, the Commerce Clause prohibits a state law that burdens 
interstate commerce “when the avowed purpose of the [law], as well 
as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences 
of competition between the states.”29 The Court invoked this general 
principle to strike a New York regulatory scheme that had been used 
to deny a license to an out-of-state milk processing facility.30 Since the 
licensing provision had been enacted “solely [for] protection of local 
economic interests, such as supply for local consumption and limita-
tion of competition,” the Court found it to be unconstitutional.31 
Since the 1980’s, when deregulation began to take hold in a vari-
ety of industries, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to ad-
dress dormant commerce jurisprudence. In one of its cases on the 
topic, General Motors v. Tracy,32 the Court evaluated Ohio’s differen-
tial tax burdens for in-state and out-of-state natural gas suppliers, but 
refused to find a violation of the dormant commerce clause on the 
particular facts that had been raised. General Motors, which mounted 
a legal challenge to Ohio’s differential tax, was a large enough cus-
tomer to purchase its gas from the open market (rendered competi-
tive by national regulators) rather than bundled gas from a state regu-
lated local distribution company (“LDC”).33 However, absent 
competition between the LDC and the open market serving General 
Motors, the Court reasoned, “there can be no local preference, 
whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce or un-
due burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may ap-
 
Section 10 or the Privileges and Imm unities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. These alternatives are not 
without their own critics. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, W hy the Priveleges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 84 M INN. L. REV. 284 (2003); 
Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, The Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. 
Harrison, 70 U. COL. L. REV. 155 (1999).  However, for purposes of this Article, let it suffice to em-
phasize that the alternatives would make protections against interstate regulatory barriers much nar-
rower. 
 29. Balwdin v. G.A.F. Selif, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 30. Id. 
 31. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du M ond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949). 
 32. 519 U.S. 278 (1997). 
 33. Id. at 281-82. 
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ply.”34 The case illustrates how intra-state regulation, which may im-
pede competition (as where, for example, state regulators retain ju-
risdiction over retail rates), poses a potential tension under the dor-
mant commerce clause, which protects interstate competition where 
national regulators have made a policy decision favoring competitive 
markets. FERC clearly has made such a decision in the context of the 
wholesale power market, making the dormant commerce clause rele-
vant. 
Other recent cases extend the dormant commerce clause beyond 
merely protecting the external (interstate) market. In C&A Carbone, 
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Supreme Court invalidated a munici-
pally-imposed monopoly over non-recyclable solid waste collected for 
processing and transfer.35 To guarantee a minimum stream of reve-
nues for the project, the Town of Clarkstown, New York adopted a 
flow control ordinance, allowing the private operator of a transfer sta-
tion to collect a fee of $81 per ton in excess of the disposal cost of 
solid waste in the private market.36 C&A Carbone, Inc. processed 
solid waste and operated a recycling center, as it was permitted to do 
under the Clarkstown flow control ordinance.37 The flow control ordi-
nance required companies like Carbone to bring nonrecylable waste 
to the locally-franchised transfer station and to pay a fee, while pro-
hibiting them from shipping the waste themselves.38 “[A] financing 
measure,” the flow control ordinance ensured that “the town-
sponsored facility will be profitable so that the local contractor can 
build it and Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in five 
years.”39 The Court reasoned that the local law violates the dormant 
commerce clause because “in practical effect and design” it bars out-
of-state sanitary landfill operators from the participating in the local 
market for solid waste disposal.40 In so reasoning, the majority drew 
from a 1925 case, written by Justice Brandeis, which held unconstitu-
tional a statute prohibiting common carriers from using state high-
ways over certain routes without a certificate of convenience and ne-
cessity.41 
 
 34. Id. at 301. 
 35. 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 36. Id. at 386-87. 
 37. Id. at 387-88. 
 38. Id. at 386-87. 
 39. Id. at 393. 
 40. Id. at 389, 394. 
 41. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court: 
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If a municipal government created and owned the facility itself, 
this would bring the monopoly within an exemption to the dormant 
commerce clause–the market-participant exemption.42 In creating 
monopolies, however, local governments frequently work with pri-
vate firms, using the advantages of the state—subsidies, below-market 
interest rates from non-taxable bonds, bypassing state or local restric-
tions on use of municipal tax powers, etc.—to assist firms and provide 
incentives for them to provide service. Since municipal governments 
often help to pay for privately-operated infrastructure, such as waste 
disposal facilities, through the issuance of bonds, it is understandable 
that a local government may want to create a monopoly, in order to 
ensure that the facility maintains sufficient revenues to cover its costs 
and to avoid jeopardizing the government’s bond rating. Such facili-
ties are allowed to collect charges, which serve the same basic func-
tion as a tax. If the government itself were to build, own, and operate 
a facility, the political process would impose a general tax, but with 
private operations subsidized by a state or locally enforced monopoly, 
the tax implications of such projects are obscured. The Town of 
Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaranteed revenue for its solid 
waste transfer station—it promised a minimum of 120,000 tons of 
waste per year, allowing the firm to make more than $9.7 million in 
annual revenue–and, after a period of five years, the town agreed to 
buy it for $1.43 One way of understanding the Court’s rejection of the 
Clarkstown flow control ordinance is based on its concerns with im-
permissible government-assisted monopolies against the backdrop of 
interstate competition. 
The basic animating principle of the recent dormant commerce 
clause cases has frequently been described as the protection against 
 
[The statute's] primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of 
the highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines not the manner of use, but the 
persons by whom the highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some persons while 
permitting it to others for the very same purpose and in the same manner. 
Id. at 315-16. 
 42. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 
(1976). W hile many have criticized this exemption to dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, it is 
defended as a pragmatic balance between competing federalism concerns. Dan T. Coenen, Untangling 
the M arket-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 M ICH. L. REV. 395 (1989). The 
exemption is limited, and is not automatically available where the state could expand into the market; 
To avail itself of the exemption the state must establish that it is a market participant and may not use 
mere contractual privity to immunize downstream regulatory conduct in a market in which it is not a 
direct participant. South-Central Timber Dev. v. W unnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
 43. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387. 
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discrimination between in-state and out-of-state competitors.44 If 
these decisions are taken at face value, the Supreme Court’s dormant 
commerce clause jurisprudence might be said to embrace a pro-
competition stance, consistent with the ideology and goals of a neo-
classical economic conception of federalism. In Tracy, for example, 
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, “[t]he dormant com-
merce clause protects markets and participants in markets, not tax 
payers as such.”45 He bolstered this vision of the dormant commerce 
clause by referencing the famous words of Justice Jackson: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer 
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the cer-
tainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, 
that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign 
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, 
every consumer may look to the free competition from every pro-
ducing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. 
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of 
this Court which has given it reality.46 
This–the neoclassical view of the dormant commerce clause–sees the 
role of federal courts as protecting states from interfering with the 
economic exchange of a free market economy.47 On this view, its pri-
mary purpose is to guard against balkanization by protecting free 
trade from state government interference in the external market. 
It would be a mistake, however, to read the dormant commerce 
clause as a constitutional mandate for competition, let alone deregu-
lation. As dormant commerce clause jurisprudence itself recognizes, 
there are exceptions to the dormant commerce clause where the state 
itself takes on the role of market participant.48 Further, the dormant 
commerce clause allows substantial state government intervention in 
the setting of prices, subsidies, and taxes, so long as a state does not 
engage in differential treatment in the same market in ways that bur-
den interstate competition.49 Moreover, since the dormant commerce 
 
 44. Paul E. M cGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 W M . &  
M ARY L. REV. 1191, 1223 (1998). 
 45. General M otors Corp v.  Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300  (1997). 
 46. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du M ond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). 
 47. M cGreal, supra note 44; Steven Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 17 NYU REV. OF L. &  SOC. CHANGE 1 (1989-90); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Com-
merce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L. J. 425 (1982). 
 48. See supra note 42 (discussing the market participant exception). 
 49. For example, one of the leading cases suggesting that the dormant commerce clause allows the 
setting of rates is M unn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding legislative approval of joint price 
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clause is not derived from the express language of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, Congress can override it by adopting a national policy that pre-
empts, or overrides, the competitive market between individual 
states. General Motors v. Tracy, for example, seems to carve out a 
safe harbor for state regulation of natural gas distribution.50 Under 
the Commerce Clause, Congress has the express authority to establish 
an agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, giving it the 
jurisdiction to regulate railroad rates previously left to individual 
states. “Our Constitution,” the late Julian Eule wrote, “did not at-
tempt to solve economic parochialism by an express prohibition 
against interference with free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative 
power over economic matters that affect more than one state to a sin-
gle national body”.51 
To take a more modern example than the now-defunct ICC rail-
road regulation regime, Congress has created FERC, which has made 
a major policy choice to implement regional competitive wholesale 
power markets.52 Congress has the power to override FERC’s deci-
sion to implement regional competitive wholesale markets, but no 
one has seriously proposed this. Alternatively, Congress might ex-
pand FERC’s jurisdiction, taking some or all regulatory authority 
over retail markets away from state regulators. If it did so, by occupy-
ing the lawmaking field, Congress might preclude states from enact-
ing some laws that discriminate against out-of-state suppliers in de-
regulated wholesale markets. But again, Congress has not done so. 
Congress’ inaction, however, does not mean that preemption plays no 
role in this context. Congress’ acquiescence in FERC’s competitive 
policies serves as one legal source for a type of federal preemption of 
individual states acting in ways that impair commerce between the 
states. Absent a change in federal policy, state efforts to curtail com-
petition in wholesale electric power markets could be suspect under 
the dormant commerce clause, to the extent that they undermine the 
interstate markets created by FERC. While a federal preemption ar-
gument for interstate market norms is based in a positive legal source 
of congressional or federal agency enactments which preclude con-
 
agreem ent by grain elevators in Chicago against a dormant commerce clause challenge, given concern 
with regulating a common carrier as a monopoly in the "public interest"). 
 50. 519 U.S. at 825. 
 51. Eule, supra note 47, at 430. 
 52. Order No. 888, Promoting W holesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities, 61 FED. REG. 21,540 (M ay 
10, 1996). 
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trary state laws, the dormant commerce clause also arguably finds 
some source in the cooperative behavior between two or more states 
that have adopted a competitive norm of exchange in which Congress 
acquiesces.53 
Many have suggested that the neoclassical account of the dor-
mant commerce clause–as a legal source of free trade policies be-
tween the states–is flawed.54 An alternative view understands the 
dormant commerce clause not as inherently protecting competition 
itself, let alone free markets, but as protecting a political process that 
makes markets possible. For instance, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. 
Healy, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts tax and re-
bate scheme for milk, even where the tax operated neutrally without 
regard to the milk’s place of origin, but where tax revenues went into 
a subsidy fund and were distributed solely to Massachusetts milk pro-
ducers.55 In writing for the majority, Justice Stevens embraced a po-
litical process account of the dormant commerce clause, in which its 
role is seen as representative-enforcing in a manner similar to 
Carolene Product’s famous footnote 4.56 As Justice Stevens remarked 
in striking down the tax and subsidy regime in West Lynn Creamery: 
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, 
are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate 
commerce, in part because ‘the existence of major in-state interests 
adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative 
abuse.’ However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a 
subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a state’s political proc-
ess can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, be-
cause one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby 
against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.57 
Rather than inherently protecting competition and free markets, the 
purposes of the dormant commerce clause doctrine can be under-
stood with the framework of Madisonian democracy as well as effi-
 
 53. Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiesence and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 88 M INN. L. REV. 1764 (2003). 
 54. See supra note 47. 
 55. 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
 56. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). John Hart Ely has applied 
the representation-reinforcing role of Carolene Products to equal protection jurisprudence. JOHN HART 
ELY, DEM OCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 57. 512 U.S. at 200 (citing M innesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 499 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 
(1981) and other cases). 
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ciency—specifically, limiting welfare-reducing interest group rent-
seeking in the state regulatory process.58 
Unlike the traditional public choice critique, which condemns all 
state and local rent-seeking, the political process account of the dor-
mant commerce clause targets only those rent-seeking laws that re-
strain commerce pursuant to implicit or explicit contracts between 
other states. The state political process allows states, like the U.S. 
Congress, to adopt rent-seeking legislation, in the form of regulation, 
subsidies, and taxes. However, an individual state cannot enact a law 
that undermines a desirable pro-commerce regime that has been put 
into place through the implicit or explicit cooperation of states, any 
more than it can undermine a pro-commerce regime adopted for-
mally by Congress or a federal agency (under the preemption clause). 
Some rent transfers are permissible, if not desirable, in state and 
local political processes. For example, rent-seeking in the form of a 
neutral corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent-seeking in the 
setting of utility rates to favor industrial growth, is likely permissible, 
and subject only to the safeguards of the local political process. How-
ever, rent-seeking in the form of exclusionary regulation that limits 
access to the interstate market is more suspect as an approach to 
regulating economic matters, especially where market exchange is the 
background norm as a matter of national policy. Florida’s Supreme 
Court rejected a dormant commerce clause challenge to use of the 
state’s restrictive power plant siting statute to restrict the building of 
new plants by out-of-state suppliers,59 but the inadequacy of a record 
establishing discrimination against out-of-state merchant suppliers 
may have impeded the development of this legal argument. At a 
minimum, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence requires states 
and localities to explain how regulatory actions and legislation re-
stricting power supply in the wholesale market or transmission expan-
sion might serve legitimate purposes, such as environmental or con-
sumer protection. 
More challenging is the constitutional status of state or local-
franchised monopolies against the backdrop of dormant commerce 
clause jurisprudence. On the political process account, the Town of 
Clarkstown, New York violated the dormant commerce clause by 
granting a monopoly that imposed a veiled tax on users of waste dis-
 
 58. For elaboration of this view, see M axell L Stearns, A Beautiful M end: A Game Theoretical 
Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 W M  &  M ARY L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 59. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000). 
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posal outside of the locally-sponsored facility, including out-of-state 
facilities. Its monopoly franchise was invalidated. In Carbone, Justice 
Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Blackmun, arguing that the majority had ignored the distinction be-
tween private and public enterprise and that the monopoly created by 
the flow control ordinance is easily distinguished from the “entrepre-
neurial favoritism” the Court has previously condemned as protec-
tionist.60 What distinguishes this monopoly from a constitutionally 
permissible monopoly, or do local and state electric, natural gas, and 
telecommunications monopolies risk the same fate if they do not 
open their service territories and network facilities to competitors? 
The historical lack of a background norm of competition excuses 
many historical monopolies from the constitutional reach of the dor-
mant commerce clause: if there is no interstate market, a state or lo-
cally imposed monopoly cannot discriminate against out-of-state 
commerce. With the development of interstate markets in telecom-
munications and electric power, however, more difficult questions 
emerge. Will any state or local monopoly raise dormant commerce 
clause problems? For example, is it unconstitutional for a utility to 
impose a surcharge on all users of distribution service, regardless of 
whether they purchase their power from local or out-of-state suppli-
ers? 
If a municipality, such as the City of Clarkstown, operates a gov-
ernment-owned monopoly over telecommunications or electric distri-
bution service, the market participant exception to the dormant 
commerce clause shields its conduct from the reach of the commerce 
clause.61 Franchised private utilities—such as investor-owned utili-
ties—pose a potential problem but are not necessarily unconstitu-
tional, even under the political process account of the dormant com-
merce clause. The political process account, however, warns state and 
local governments to approach the financing of such operations with 
care. In the Carbone case, the Town of Clarkstown promised to make 
up losses from operating the transfer facility at competitive rates, pre-
sumably by taking these losses out of its general revenues.62 What the 
dormant commerce clause seems to prohibit is a local government 
 
 60. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 416 (1994) (Souuter, J., dissent-
ing). According to the dissent, "The Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clark-
stown from themselves." Id. at 432. Thus, the dissent rejects extending the political process account 
beyond scenarios that discriminate between local and out-of-town participants. 
 61. See supra note 42 (describing the market participant exception). 
 62. See supra notes 35-43. 
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explicitly indemnifying a private monopoly out of the public fisc, even 
where these impose the same monopoly and fees on both in-state and 
out-of-state providers of service. The Takings Clause does not require 
governments to take on such obligations, but the dormant commerce 
clause may prohibit them if they are the result of rent-seeking that 
imposes burdens on the interstate market. Further, as in Carbone, au-
thorizing above-market fees solely for purposes of maintaining the 
monopoly may be constitutionally suspect.63 As we move from local to 
state monopoly franchises, concerns with a single firm capturing the 
political process are weaker—a single firm that dominates municipal 
politics may have little power in state-wide regulatory and political 
processes—so state-franchised monopolies may be more likely to pass 
constitutional muster; but even neutral financing arrangements may 
be suspect if they favor local enterprise and have the “practical effect 
and design” of impeding out-of-state competitors. 
To return to the Cross-Sound example and other state moratoria 
on siting new facilities, to the extent that FERC has deregulated 
wholesale power, such disputes raise potential issues of great concern 
under the dormant commerce clause. While the state of Connecticut 
certainly may impose legitimate environmental restrictions on per-
mits, its moratorium raises serious anticompetitive concerns—
particularly where it is used to keep a project that has already been 
built from becoming operational. The dormant commerce clause will 
be a likely tool for challenging such restrictions, especially where, as 
in Connecticut, competitors stand to benefit from the restriction. 
State and local environmental regulation can survive such dormant 
commerce clause challenges. However, refusing siting due to state-
based claims of need, or where in-state competitors are aligned with 
environmental interests, will increasingly raise concerns under the 
dormant commerce clause. 
III.  LOOKING TO CONGRESS AND COURTS TO OVERCOME IMPASSES 
While the dormant commerce clause may be a necessary limit on 
states’ ability to limit siting, it is not sufficient to ensure competitive 
interstate power markets. The dormant commerce clause will invali-
date only the most blatantly protectionist state regulations. It cer-
tainly does not deal well with the problem of state inaction, or state 
stonewalling against interstate power markets due to a lack of state 
 
 63. Id. 
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legislative authorization to approve new transmission projects.64 
Given the combination of prevalent state inaction in expanding 
transmission facilities, along with the many legitimate environmental 
concerns behind state and local siting laws, the dormant commerce 
clause will probably not be sufficient to overcome impasses between 
states, or between state and federal regulators. Dormant commerce 
clause principles will likely be under enforced in this context. 
In this context, federal preemption is one way of bolstering the 
interstate market coordination goals of the dormant commerce 
clause. Ideally, Congress needs to expand FERC’s authority over 
transmission line siting. If Congress does not do so—and Congress 
certainly is not the institution on which we should rely—federal 
courts have the power to nudge states towards action by empowering 
state siting boards to take into account federal goals in interstate 
transmission markets, even absent state legislative authorization. 
A. Congress’ Obstacles 
Proposals to expand FERC’s authority over transmission siting 
are not new. For more than a decade, industry experts have recog-
nized that such modifications to the FPA will be necessary for compe-
tition to thrive.65 The most recent proposals do not vest FERC with 
primary authority over siting, but envision FERC as playing a back-
up role where individual states fail to reach closure on siting disputes 
 
 64. As Ashley Brown and Damon Daniels observe, "Because very few states include explicit ref-
erence to regional considerations in the substantive law governing eminent domain or siting authority, it 
is left to siting officials and reviewing courts to factor regional effects into the calculation of which pro-
jects serve the public interest." Brown & Daniels, supra note 2, at 26. If a state legislature fails to dele-
gate such authority to a regulator, there is a potential problem of inaction on the part of both state legis-
latures and regulators. 
 65. Judge Richard Cudahy sees federal regulation of electric power transmission "more or less 
inherent in the scheme of deregulation and competition, which depends for its functioning upon wide-
spread access to the transmission network." Richard D. Cudahy, Full Circle in the Formerly Regulated 
Industries?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 767, 768 (2002). Richard Pierce embraces expanded congressional 
authorization for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to resolve transmission siting disputes, 
noting the inevitable incentives states face to erect impediments to interstate commerce. Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy & M arket Entry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. &  POL'Y FORUM  
167 (2005) (Duke Environmental Law & Policy symposium contribution). For more than a decade, 
Pierce has been arguing for the same basic congressional solution. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The State of 
the Transition to Competitive M arkets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15 ENERGY L. J. 323 (1994). Jim 
Chen advocates increased federal authority over telecommunications for similar reasons. Jim Chen, 
Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its 
Pitfalls, 2 J. TEL. &  HIGH TECH. L. 307 (2003). 
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on their own.66 Regional transmission operators (“RTOs”) will pro-
vide an important forum for the resolution of these disputes, with 
FERC having the ultimate authority to order expansion where states 
fail to do so on their own.67 It is likely that such proposals will con-
tinue to be proposed to Congress, although it is questionable whether 
they will be adopted into law. 
As many have suggested, FERC’s authority to preempt state sit-
ing of transmission lines needs to be modified.68 Unfortunately, Con-
gress faces some institutional obstacles of its own in implementing re-
forms. In a recent defense of the “presumption against preemption,” 
which would empower states to take the initiative to solve many of 
these issues on their own, Roderick Hills summarizes three main fail-
ures in the federal government, and particularly Congress, in setting 
statutory reform agendas.69 Each of these applies to energy legisla-
tion, such as recent proposals to expand FERC’s transmission juris-
diction. 
First, Hills observes that collective action problems allow nar-
rowly focused interest groups to control even national regulatory 
processes, echoing what Richard Stewart has referred to as “Madi-
son’s Nightmare”70—a faction-ridden maze of capture of national ma-
joritarian political processes by interest groups. In the context of en-
ergy legislation, it is quite common for Congress to bundle together 
multiple unregulated reforms, producing logrolling solutions that may 
confront obstacles due to one or two high-profile objectionable provi-
sions. For example, the main energy bill before Congress in 2003 con-
tained provisions that would have more clearly expanded FERC’s au-
thority over transmission in order to enhance reliability.71 This bill 
 
 66. Edward Comer, FERC and the States: A M arriage of Necessity, ELEC. J., November 2004, at 
85, 87 (advocating "national energy legislation that contains a provision for the Commission to have 
limited backstop transmission siting authority to help site transmission lines in 'interstate congestion 
areas' designated by the Department of Energy is states have been unable to agree or move forward."). 
 67. Id. at 86 ("Regional transmission organizations can play an important part in planning and 
expanding transmission systems to meet the needs of regional electricity markets."). 
 68. In this symposium issue, for instance, Professor Pierce embraces expanded congressional au-
thorization for FERC to resolve transmission siting disputes. Pierce, Environmental Regulation, Energy 
& M arket Entry, supra note 65. However, Congress has consistently failed to act to adopt such propos-
als. 
 69. Roderick M . Hills, Jr. Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Law-
making Process, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=412000 (last visited 
M ar. 5, 2005). 
 70. Richard B. Stewart, M adison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335. (1990). 
 71. Peter Berh & Dan M organ, W ithout Energy Legislation, Grid, Power Policy in Limbo, W ASH. 
POST, Nov. 27, 2003, at E01. 
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failed to pass primarily because of unrelated statutory provisions lim-
iting state tort liability for the fuel oxygenate methyl tertiary-butyl 
ether (MTBE).72 
In addition, as Hills suggests, individual representatives are fre-
quently preoccupied with pleasing constituents—by approving ear-
marks and pork-loaded packages—leading Congress to neglect gen-
eral policymaking.73 Again, energy legislation provides an example of 
the failures of the national political process. The 2003 energy bill con-
tained multiple provisions on different topics aimed at local or re-
gional constituents, such as provisions aimed to provide federal aid 
for a Shreveport, Louisiana shopping mall which houses the chain res-
taurant “Hooters.”74 Senator John McCain dubbed the proposed leg-
islation a bill for “Hooters and polluters.”75 
Finally, Hills observes, what Samuel Beer has called “political 
overload”76 plagues the ability of Congress to set the regulatory 
agenda, since only a small number of issues can effectively occupy 
Congress’ decision agenda.77 In the energy context, again, Congress is 
unlikely to even consider national energy legislation unless a major 
national or international crisis brings it to the agenda—the OPEC oil 
embargo (leading to passage of Carter’s energy plan in 1978), the 
Gulf War (leading to passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992), or 
post-September 11 concerns over the relationship between terrorism 
and oil (leading to Congress’ failed energy bill in 2003). On occasion, 
individual members of Congress propose stand-alone bills designed to 
expand FERC’s authority, but these generally have little support in 
Congress and frequently disappear without a hearing.78 
Even if Congress fails to expand FERC’s authority—as much of 
the political science Roderick Hills cites to would predict—the Cross-
Sound line dispute illustrates that FERC may increasingly play a role 
 
 72. Carl Hulse, Even W ith Bush's Support W ide-Ranging Legislation M ay Have Been Sunk W ith 
Excess, N.Y. TIM ES, Nov. 26, 2003, at A17. 
 73. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, & M orris Fiorina, THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE 
AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987). 
 74. Dan M organ, The GOP Congress, High on the Hog, W ASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at B01. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Samuel H. Beer, Political Overload and Federalism, 10 POLITY 5 (1977). 
 77. JOHN W . KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 16-18 (1995). 
 78. In 2004, Senator Hillary Clinton proposed a stand-alone reliability bill, presumably because 
she had concluded that the larger energy bill was doomed. See Senator Clinton to Push Reliability Bill, 
Urges Lawmakers to Pass It Apart from the Energy Bill, ELEC. UTIL. W EEK, Jan. 20, 2004 at 3. How-
ever, with an election year in 2004, many considered a more streamlined bill unlikely to pass Congress 
unless it was very modest. 
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in related regulatory proceedings over which it has jurisdiction and 
can play a positive role in the process. The Cross-Sound dispute illus-
trates how FERC has some limited powers to do things on its own, 
absent Congressional authorization through new statutes. For exam-
ple, in the Cross-Sound dispute, FERC threatened to make a decision 
in a related proceeding that would involve updating an older trans-
mission line, and this threat of regulatory action brought the state 
regulators to the negotiation table.79 FERC’s cognate authority over 
related projects is a powerful tool to bring parties to the bargaining 
table. Although not every environmental concern was placated by the 
resulting settlement, Long Island Power Authority (“LIPA”), Cross-
Sound and Connecticut Light & Power Company (“CL&P”) each 
agreed to contribute $2 million to a fund, to be administered jointly 
by New York and Connecticut, which would be dedicated to the study 
and preservation of Long Island Sound.80 In some instances, FERC 
may be able to use its clear regulatory authority—over mergers, 
transmission tariffs, and RTOs—to bring parties to the table when 
impasses occur, even if it is unable to preempt state siting processes. 
Yet, it is well recognized that FERC cannot solve these disputes on its 
own.81 
As counterintuitive as it might sound, absent action by Congress 
and FERC, the presumption should be in favor of state siting boards 
acting to solve the problems with interstate transmission. If nothing 
else, a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction might work to set the 
national lawmaking agenda, but more important, it might place clear 
incentives with state regulators, making action more likely in contexts 
where state and federal regulators seem to have reached an impasse. 
B. How Federal Courts Can Overcome Recalcitrant State Legislatures 
Many state siting statutes were adopted with old regulatory struc-
tures—a nationally-uniform cost-of-service structure—in mind. In 
many states, siting statutes do not authorize state or local regulators 
to act to open up their network access facilities to out-of-state com-
petitors.82 In this sense, one barrier to interstate power markets is 
state legislatures, which lack the institutional incentive to modify old 
regulatory statutes. To the extent the problem is state legislature re-
 
 79. See supra note 65 (describing the prospect of federal intervention). 
 80. Parties Set Deal, supra note 17. 
 81. See, e.g., Pierce, Environmental Regulation, Energy & M arket Entry, supra note 65; Comer, 
supra note 66. 
 82. See Brown & Daniels, supra note 2. 
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calcitrance (whether tacit or explicit), federal courts might attempt to 
draw on preemption principles to overcome the impasses by introduc-
ing greater competition in the state political process, reducing the 
power of any one branch or level of state or local government to be 
recalcitrant through inaction. 
As an illustration, consider the issue of a state legislature’s fail-
ure to authorize regulatory action by state or local agencies under 
state siting statutes. State siting bodies may not be able to act to site 
facilities, or even to consider the interstate implications of siting, ab-
sent authorization by a state legislature. In the context of deregulated 
wholesale power markets individual states frequently face strong in-
centives to protect firms in their own internal market, such as local 
utilities. Several states have adopted moratoria on exempt wholesale 
generators, or have limited regulators’ authority to site such plants to 
in-state utilities only.83 Florida’s Supreme Court, for example, has in-
terpreted a state power plant siting statute to limit plant siting to 
those suppliers who are Florida utilities or who have contracts with 
Florida utilities.84 Effectively, merchant power plants are precluded 
from siting in Florida for purposes of entering the interstate market. 
Perhaps taking a cue from Florida’s success in blocking the develop-
ment of new wholesale power plants that do not directly serve in-state 
customers, other state and local governments, particularly in the 
Southeastern United States, have imposed moratoria on merchant 
plants.85 Pursuant to the siting statute passed by the Florida Legisla-
ture, Duke Energy’s application was rejected by the state Supreme 
Court, even though the state agency initially had accepted the appli-
cation under a belief that it had the legal jurisdiction to do so.86 
 
 83. Concerned with their states becoming transmission superhighways or power plant siting 
grounds for others, many states have considered or adopted such moratoria. See, e.g., Conn. Governor 
Signs M oratorium on Grid Projects, Keeping Cross Sound in Limbo, POW ER M ARKETS W EEK, June 30, 
2003, at 31 (describing Connecticut's moratorium on new transmission lines); Florida County Imposes 
Power Plant M oratorium, ELEC. DAILY, July 2, 2001, at 1 (describing Broward County, Florida, mora-
torium that stalled a 511 M W  merchant power plant that had been approved by city officials in Deer-
field Beach, Florida); Indiana Communities Press for Power Plant M oratorium, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, 
M arch 1, 2000 (indicating governor's support for power plant moratorium). 
 84. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that state's power plant 
siting statute "was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a proposed power plant out-
put that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who purchase electrical power at retail 
rates,"). 
 85. Deisinger, 2000; Nervous of NOx, Southern Govs. Put Plants on Hold, ELEC. DAILY, Aug. 28, 
2001; State Limits on M erchant Plants a Growing W orry, GENERATION W EEKLY, Aug. 22, 2001. 
 86. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000). 
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However, even where a state legislature is recalcitrant and fails 
to authorize local or state-wide regulatory agencies to take into ac-
count federal goals (such as concerns with reliability in deregulated 
wholesale power markets) while siting transmission lines or power 
plants, courts could presumptively authorize such officials to act to 
pursue federal goals. Roderick Hills has argued for a presumption 
against preemption87—and the political science reasons he gives for it 
have particular resonance in the context of electric power—but in 
many instances (as in Florida), state officials and local political bodies 
lack the authority to act. As Hills has argued elsewhere, state regula-
tory initiative on issues might be facilitated by “dissecting the state” if 
state and local agencies are presumptively authorized to implement 
federal goals, even where state enabling legislation is ambiguous as to 
state agency jurisdiction.88 When a federal program gives grant money 
directly to a state governor or local governments, it plays the execu-
tive branch or local governments off against the state. Similarly, when 
Congress has passed a statute such as the Federal Power Act and a 
federal agency has clearly articulated general goals in implementing 
this statute (as FERC has articulated the goal of deregulated inter-
state wholesale power markets), 89 even if Congress has not delegated 
specific implementation authority to the agency, it might be implied 
that it has given remedial implementation authority to state agencies, 
overriding state constitutional doctrines such as separation of powers. 
Presumptive preemption of structural constraints in state constitu-
tions serves the function of allowing states to work towards correcting 
congressional failures that may remain in statutes. 
Instead of deferring to state court interpretations of limited au-
thority for siting boards, an alternative approach to reviewing the 
agency’s jurisdiction would ignore the ambiguous jurisdictional limits 
in the state statute, presumptively authorizing the state officials to 
consider the application—and to site the facility—if this were related 
to the pursuit of clear (albeit general) federal goals in reliable deregu-
lated wholesale power markets. This presumption would be overcome 
only if the state legislature is explicit in its recalcitrance, adopting a 
statute that precludes consideration of the issue by state regulators. 
By simultaneously embracing a presumption against federal pre-
emption in interpretation of statutes and regulations and a presump-
 
 87. See Hills, supra note 69. 
 88. Roderick M . Hills, Jr. Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local 
Officials From State Legislatures' Control, 97 M ICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999). 
 89. See supra note 52 (referencing Order No. 888). 
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tion in favor of state or local regulatory action (i.e., authorizing state 
and local officials to act, notwithstanding a tacitly recalcitrant legisla-
ture), public law could align incentives to favor national reform of 
statutes or regulations in the context of economic regulation. In con-
trast to the current approach, a presumption against preemption 
would leave responsibility clearly in the hands of state actors. State 
and local officials would presumptively be authorized to act to pursue 
federal goals, although if a state legislature wishes to override the au-
thority of a state agency to implement a federal program, it would 
possess the authority to do so expressly. So understood, a judicially-
imposed set of default rules could promote coordinated federalism, 
even where Congress has not acted. Judicially-led coordinated feder-
alism would replace court-mediated competition between the federal 
government and the states, which often leads to regulatory impasse, 
with cooperation. Simultaneously, federal courts may stimulate some 
regulatory action to address interstate network problems in states 
where none currently exits by introducing competition within the 
branches of state government. There are two primary objections to 
such a set of default rules: first, that federal courts lack the power to 
implement them and that they are internally inconsistent; and second, 
that this approach glorifies states’ rights or idealizes states as innova-
tors. 
To address the second objection first, this is not a states’ rights 
view of economic regulation. Indeed, there is no such thing, given that 
Congress has broad power to override states on most, if not all, issues 
of economic regulation. Even this, though, does not make states black 
boxes in discussion of the allocation of jurisdictional authority. States 
have an important role to play. The point is not, however, that states 
are inherently superior over the national government as innovator. 
Nor is it to promote decentralization as an end state of affairs. In-
stead, states would act as facilitators and agenda-setters in national 
lawmaking, helping national solutions to adapt to regulatory prob-
lems where the national lawmaking process fails to do so on its own. 
Judicially-led coordinated federalism is a second-best solution to con-
gressional reforms of national regulatory statutes that fail to give fed-
eral agency regulators the necessary jurisdiction, but it also may 
prove necessary to overcome existing obstacles to regulatory reform 
in network industries. 
The first objection—that federal courts lack the power to apply 
these default rules and they are internally inconsistent—also does not 
withstand scrutiny. These proposals are not premised on any constitu-
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tional power that that the conventional set of default rules in public 
law do not also rely on. The power to vest state and local officials 
with authority to implement federal goals, like conventionally-
accepted judicial power to create implied preemption, can be derived 
from the Commerce Clause.90 Where Congress or federal regulators, 
within their constitutional authority, have stated a general goal, 
courts presumably would look to state or local regulators to imple-
ment it.91 This is not coercive, as state political actors still would have 
to make the choice to regulate. If the state political process, such as 
by legislative action, explicitly overrides this choice, state action is 
more likely to exist for purposes of mounting a dormant commerce 
clause challenge if the state approach imposes spillover costs on inter-
state commerce.92 This approach downplays the significance of “inde-
pendent” state constitutions, but many states already recognize in 
their constitutional jurisprudence that state constitutions are not to be 
interpreted in isolation where a state is implementing a federal pro-
gram.93 As a matter of constitutional law, federal courts have as much 
power to implement such a set of default rules as they do to read im-
plied preemption of state law into federal statutes and regulations.94 
In fact, to the extent that the presumptive authorization of state ex-
ecutive or local agency regulation to implement federal goals is based 
on political process considerations, rather than a substantive legal 
mandate that altogether precludes state regulation, it should be less 
controversial than implied preemption of substantive law, under 
which a federal court forces a state to make a substantive policy 
choice that is consistent with federal law even where Congress has not 
clearly spoken. Rather than reading judicial power broadly by expan-
sive jurisdictional readings of federal statutes and regulations–as tra-
 
 90. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate activities such as electric power trans-
mission. Federal Courts interpret the scope of delegations to federal agencies. Thus, under federal pre-
emption doctrine, federal courts have the authority to override state legislatures where national interests 
authorized by Congress warrant it. 
 91. M uch as Hills envisions courts presumptively authorizing state and local officials to pursue 
national goals. Hills, supra note 88. 
 92. See supra Part II (discussing dormant commerce clause). 
 93. See, e.g., Ex Parte Elliott, 973 S.W .2d 737 (Tex. App. 1998); M cFaddin v. Jackson, 738 
S.W .2d 176 (Tenn. 1987); Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976). Thus, even 
where federal courts do not exercise such authority, state courts might authorize such action as the best 
interpretation of state constitutional separation of powers doctrine. As I have argued elsewhere, implicit 
authorization for state executive and local agencies to act on behalf of federal goals is the best interpre-
tation of state separation of powers— a matter of state constitutional law. Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions 
and Constitutional Duels, __ W M . &  M ARY L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2005). 
 94. See supra note 90. 
081505 ROSSI.DOC 11/14/2005  4:37 PM  
Spring 2005] TRANSM ISSION SITING 337 
ditional jurisdictional federalism would envision–the default rules for 
preemption envision a more modest role for the courts, as they align 
political incentives to favor cooperative federalism approaches even 
where Congress has not explicitly done so. While a presumption 
against preemption of substantive statutes and regulations may seem 
at odds with a presumption that preempts state constitution alloca-
tions of powers, these default rules are no less inconsistent than the 
conventional public law approach, which favors preemption of sub-
stantive law but disfavors preemption of state constitutions. 
Such an approach gives state and local governments a more posi-
tive role to play in deregulated markets than judicial federalism cur-
rently envisions under public law. It creates a political process that is 
more likely to clarify jurisdictional responsibility, while also lowering 
the costs of using state government to implement federal goals. In the 
long run, it might also promote a more stable national solution on 
important issues than the conventional approach of relying on courts 
to draw the lines between incomplete federal regulation and the 
states. 
For example, in the context of electricity transmission siting, if 
state and local regulatory commissions are granted presumptive au-
thority to consider national goals in reliable wholesale power mar-
kets, states would clearly share responsibility with Congress for 
transmission expansion. At least some state regulator in each state 
would clearly possess the regulatory power to expand transmission to 
accommodate deregulated markets. States might also be implicitly au-
thorized to build pricing for such transmission expansion into their 
own regulatory structures for retail rates. This will not solve every 
problem with regulation of electric power transmission, for which a 
national solution is necessary. Some states may choose to expand 
transmission, allowing deregulated markets to work, while others may 
not, creating chokehold regions that could force consideration of a 
more national solution to state-based transmission regulation. At the 
same time, responsibility for the lag clearly would sit with the states 
or Congress. If states are presumptively authorized to take such goals 
into account, presumably a state’s failure to act to site transmission in 
response to requests for transmission expansion could be brought 
within the realm of the dormant commerce clause, ultimately facilitat-
ing the emergence of more cooperative solutions between states 
where national regulators fail to take action. At a minimum, recalci-
trant state legislatures would be required to explicitly reject state par-
ticipation in national markets. Designing default rules for judicial re-
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view with these bargaining problems in mind will not bring an end to 
all jurisdictional conflicts and impasses. Such design can, however, 
make explicit previously hidden institutional preferences within states 
for recalcitrance with national competition policies, better facilitating 
disruption of the jurisdictional impasses that plague the current ap-
proach to federal preemption. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
FERC’s wholesale competition policies increasingly make dor-
mant commerce clause principles relevant. This will have important 
implications for state siting processes, in which many environmental 
concerns with power plants and transmission lines are raised. But 
there is reason to think that the dormant commerce clause will not be 
strong enough as a legal norm to overcome siting impasses. Ulti-
mately, Congress needs to act to expand FERC’s authority over 
transmission siting. As FERC Chairman Pat Wood stated before 
Congress in 2004: 
The view of one State should not be the sole determinant of 
whether a region’s electrical customers receive the economic and 
reliability benefits of facilities that have already been built. In these 
narrow circumstances, the protection of interstate commerce may 
warrant a greater federal role. 
This suggestion is related to, but separate from, the issue in the 
pending energy bill of having a federal backstop for siting of signifi-
cant new interstate power transmission projects . . . .95 
FERC itself has recognized the need for expanded jurisdiction. Once 
Congress approves it—and that may take some time—the expansion 
of FERC’s authority over transmission siting may require modifica-
tion of state environmental regulation in the context of power plant 
transmission statutes. Environmental regulation will not necessarily 
be rendered redundant, although some modification of state laws will 
be necessary. States may retain the authority to consider local land 
use concerns, as well as pure environmental protection concerns un-
der state siting statutes. Protectionist barriers to siting, even those 
that are politically aligned with environmental protection, will in-
creasingly bump up against the dormant commerce clause. Further, 
with modification to the FPA, FERC will increasingly play some role 
in overriding states where impasses result. One solution may be for 
states to play a more coordinated role in raising environmental con-
cerns in the context of an RTO. 
 
 95. Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Patrick W ood, III, Chairman, FERC). 
081505 ROSSI.DOC 11/14/2005  4:37 PM  
Spring 2005] TRANSM ISSION SITING 339 
As Chairman Woods has recognized, FERC has some role under 
existing law to arbitrate siting disputes where states are at an impasse, 
even where Congress fails to act. Even if Congress does not act to ex-
pand FERC’s jurisdiction over transmission siting, FERC has some 
important tools at its disposal which can help to bring states and 
stakeholders to the bargaining table. The Cross-Sound dispute illus-
trates the positive role that FERC may be able to play in this process. 
However, FERC may not be able to solve impasses on its own. If 
Congress does not expand FERC’s jurisdiction and role, it is entirely 
appropriate for federal courts to step up to the plate in resolving sit-
ing impasses by looking to the dormant commerce clause and to fed-
eral preemption principles to override recalcitrant state legislatures. 
